China’s Digital Footprint in the Arctic: The Strategic Role of Satellite and Subsea Cable Infrastructure

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Svalbard Satellite Station (SvalSat) near Longyearbyen, Svalbard, Norway. The facility has been linked to China’s expanding presence in the Arctic through satellite data access and ground infrastructure cooperation. Photo: Bernt Rostad

The Arctic Institute China Series 2025

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At present, the Arctic is the focal point of competition not only for natural resources and new transportation routes, but also for digital infrastructures. The competition for influence by major powers, whether or not they are in the Arctic Circle, gives the region a new dimension even though global warming makes it more accessible. These days, the Arctic is at the forefront of issues like infrastructure dominance, digital sovereignty, and data security.

China’s designation as a near-Arctic state is a clear indication of its interest in the region. At the core of its “Digital Silk Road” vision—envisioned as the digital pillar of the Belt and Road Initiative—are the satellite ground stations, fiber optic cables, and icebreaker ships it is building in the Arctic. Although China has been officially declared an “near-Arctic State,” a significant portion of its investments in the region are still in the project phase. However, China’s digital infrastructure investments are extremely noteworthy in terms of scope and dual-use capabilities compared to other countries. Indeed, China’s scientific and economic activities in the Arctic are believed to be supported by military and intelligence objectives. These activities, framed as scientific or economic endeavors as part of China’s governance approach, may also provide intelligence, surveillance, and military support capabilities.¹⁾Falco G, Boschetti N & Nikas I (2024) Undercover Infrastructure: Dual-Use Arctic Satellite Ground Stations. CIGI Papers No. 291, March. Waterloo: Centre for International Governance Innovation. https://www.cigionline.org/static/documents/no.291.pdf. Accessed on 26 May 2025 However, the United States has very limited private and strategic dual investments outside NASA. Instead of directly investing in infrastructure in the Arctic, the US has adopted a much more passive “monitor and response” strategy.

This article attempts to analyze the effects of China’s technological presence on regional security balances and global power competition by looking at its digital footprints in the Arctic. The paper’s main argument is that China’s digital footprints have spawned a new strategic rivalry in the Arctic that intersects with China’s quest for digital supremacy. In particular, China’s cooperation with Russia must be highlighted. Since the collapse of cooperation with Western countries in the Arctic, China has been cooperating more and more with Russia to maintain its regional presence. The growing cooperation between China and Russia in the region cannot only be interpreted as a pragmatic change, but also as part of a broader strategy of divergence between the two powers that advocate a multipolar world order.

China’s Arctic Strategy in the Digital Age

China claims that the right to exploit Arctic resources belongs to all nations. Chinese interests are being brought into the international arena with this 2009 claim. China’s maritime rights and interests are, in fact, outlined in the 2015 White Paper.²⁾State Council of China (2015) China’s Military Strategy. The People’s Republic of China. http://english.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2015/05/27/content_281475115610833.htm. Accessed on 20 May 2025 China’s interest in the region is driven by its current energy needs as well as resource security. In terms of transportation, China seeks new and shorter transit routes that will contribute to global trade and transportation. In sum, China’s interests are rooted in its desire to designate the Arctic as a global common heritage for the benefit of humanity.³⁾Reinke de Buitrago S (2020) China’s Aspirations as a “Near Arctic State”: Growing Stakeholder or Growing Risk? In: Weber J (ed) Handbook on Geopolitics and Security in the Arctic: The High North Between Cooperation and Confrontation. Cham: Springer, pp. 97–112. In 2013, China obtained observer status in the Arctic Council, positioning itself as a ‘near-Arctic state(近北极国家, jin beiji guojia) and becoming part of Arctic policies.

China is placing a high priority on the digital component of its Arctic policies as it rapidly adjusts to the digital era. The 2018 Arctic Policy Paper outlines China’s vision for Arctic digital infrastructure. Underlining the idea of advancing common interests through the Arctic, China aims to increase Arctic digital connectivity and build a global infrastructure network.⁴⁾State Council of China (2018) China’s Arctic Policy. Beijing: The State Council Information Office of the PRC. https://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2018/01/26/content_281476026660336.htm. Accessed on 20 May 2025 The goal of increasing digital connectivity brings with it digital infrastructure projects such as the deployment of submarine cables under the Arctic Connectivity Project and 5G. In this context, China is developing bilateral ties with Arctic countries and building its legitimacy by joining the Arctic Council.⁵⁾Parsons E (2021) Chinese Arctic Discourse, 2018 to Present. NAADSN Policy Primer. North American and Arctic Defence and Security Network. https://www.naadsn.ca/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/NAADSN-Policy-Primer_Erin-Parsons_June2021.pdf. Accessed on 20 May 2025 However, some of these initiatives and projects have raised concerns for Arctic host countries in terms of data security and environmental impacts. For example, the China-Finland Action Plan published in 2024 does not include the Arctic region. However, in 2019, it was envisaged that Arctic cooperation would be deepened. Since 2019, several joint Arctic initiatives between China and Finland have been either halted or discontinued—including the shelving of the Arctic Connect project and the denial of satellite service access to China at the Arctic Space Center in Sodankylä.⁶⁾Puranen, M. and Kopra, S. (2024) Finland Retreats From the Polar Silk Road. High North News. https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/finland-retreats-polar-silk-road. Accessed on 2 August 2025

China’s ‘Polar Silk Road’ project aims to create a digital network connecting Europe to Asia via the Northern Sea Route. In the 2017 Vision for Maritime Cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative, the ‘21st Century Maritime Silk Road’, the maritime pillar of the Belt and Road Initiative, was developed, aiming to establish a multidimensional and inclusive ‘Blue Partnership’ with the littoral states. As a multi-layered cooperation framework, the Maritime Silk Road aims to develop sea-based digital infrastructures and digitalize trade. In this document, China defines the Arctic Ocean as a new transportation and trade route to Europe and sees it as one of the branches of the Maritime Silk Road.⁷⁾National Development and Reform Commission & State Oceanic Administration (2017) Vision for Maritime Cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative. Beijing: Government of the PRC. https://english.www.gov.cn/archive/publications/2017/06/20/content_281475691873460.htm. Accessed on 20 May 2025 Moreover, the accelerating need for China to establish a Belt and Road route through the Arctic is significant in that the Arctic route stretches the time to be established by nearly half.

Satellite Infrastructure and Strategic Observation

China is integrating its space and geospatial capabilities with its strategic objectives in the Arctic region. This approach consists of four main elements. The first is the scientific arm and civil-military fusion. Accordingly, the foundations for a stronger Arctic presence must be laid through science and technology. The use of comprehensive political, economic, scientific, strategic and military levers of power should be combined. The second is synthetic aperture radar (SAR) satellites. These satellites enable over-the-horizon targeting of surface assets, operating day and night and in all weather conditions. The third element is China’s Gaofen Program of high-resolution electro-optical Earth observation satellites. The last element is the Beidou navigation system.⁸⁾Puranen M & Kopra S (2023) China’s Arctic Strategy: A Comprehensive Approach in Times of Great Power Rivalry. Scandinavian Journal of Military Studies 6(1): 239–253. https://sjms.nu/articles/10.31374/sjms.196. Accessed on 20 May 2025

China’s geographical influence by 2025 will be fueled by more than just the Belt and Road initiative and the projects it has created for it. These days, China uses space exploration, digital infrastructure, and satellites as strategic instruments. Beijing has made significant investments in navigation and mapping systems in recent years. The US GPS is actually in competition with China’s BeiDou Navigation Satellite System (BDS), as was previously mentioned. The Digital Silk Road includes this growing influence.

China independently developed the BeiDou Navigation Satellite System throughout the 2000s. Aiming to be a pioneer in global satellite navigation systems, China has been using these systems for navigation, resource exploration and monitoring, especially in the Arctic along the ‘Polar Silk Road’ route. In order to explore its capabilities in global satellite systems, China has conducted some trials in the Arctic region. For instance; in 2019, it evaluated technologies such as very high frequency radio link and medium frequency Navtex systems.⁹⁾Chan M (2019) China’s BeiDou satellite navigation system breaks underwater barriers, naval shipbuilder says. South China Morning Post, 20 June. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3015265/chinas-beidou-satellite-navigation-system-breaks-underwater. Accessed on 22 May 2025 For these purposes, China has financed a satellite earth station in Kiruna, Sweden. It has also planned similar projects in Greenland, Iceland and Finland.¹⁰⁾Wood P, Stone A & Lee TA (2021) China’s Ground Segment: Building the Pillars of a Great Space Power. Montgomery: China Aerospace Studies Institute, Air University.

Infrastructure such as ground stations in the Arctic serves China’s commercial and scientific purposes, but also supports military or intelligence objectives due to their strategic location.¹¹⁾Falco G, Boschetti N & Nikas I (2024) Undercover Infrastructure: Dual-Use Arctic Satellite Ground Stations. CIGI Papers No. 291, March. Waterloo: Centre for International Governance Innovation. https://www.cigionline.org/static/documents/no.291.pdf. Accessed on 26 May 2025 For example, the presence of Chinese companies in critical infrastructure, such as the TikTok data center in Norway, can be part of the logistics network to support military operations.¹²⁾Pezard S, Chindea IA, Aoki N, Lumpkin D & Shokh Y (2025) China’s Economic, Scientific, and Information Activities in the Arctic: Benign Activities or Hidden Agenda? Santa Monica: RAND Corporation. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA2823-1.html. Accessed on 24 December 2025 As a result, China gains geographical advantages over challenges such as the Indo-Pacific by being present in the region with technology and infrastructure networks.

Subsea Cables and Data Corridors

Infrastructure is vital for access, connectivity, settlement and productivity. Remoteness of distance shapes Arctic infrastructure. Geography makes the maintenance and repair of infrastructures much more complicated. As an important element of digital sovereignty, submarine cables are crucial for communication and control of data flow. The Arctic region is an important part of the global internet infrastructure with its submarine cables and data corridors. In recent years, an autonomous approach to Arctic data corridors that emphasizes the sovereignty of individual states has come to the fore. China is one of these countries with a claim to cyber sovereignty. China’s interest in the region is reflected in 10,500 kilometers of fiber optic cable.¹³⁾Shi T (2017) 10,000 Kilometers of Fiber-Optic Cable Show China’s Interest in Warming Arctic. Bloomberg Politics, 14 December. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-12-13/undersea-cable-project-shows-china-s-interest-in-warming-arctic. Accessed on 27 May 2025 Given the potential of the Arctic Ocean to reduce latency in data traffic between Asia and Europe, China’s interest in the region is inevitable.

China is conducting hydrographic and topographic submarine surveys necessary for the planning and laying of submarine cables. In addition, officials from the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT), responsible for industrial and information technology policies, have been meeting with their Finnish counterparts.¹⁴⁾Holz H, Taffer A, Miller A & DeThomas B (2022) Exploring the Relationship Between China’s Arctic Investment and Its National Strategy. Arlington, VA: CNA. https://www.cna.org/reports/2022/01/exploring-the-relationship-beween-chinas-arctic-investment-and-its-national-strategy.pdf. Accessed on 27 May 2025 This shows that there is data diplomacy in telecommunications.

China and Russia cooperate in the Arctic region. One of the prominent projects in this cooperation is the China-Russia Arctic Sea Cable (CRSAC). The planned submarine fiber optic cables, starting from China’s coastal cities and extending from Russia’s northern coast to the Arctic, create an opportunity for the two countries to increase their digital infrastructure capacity and deepen their strategic cooperation.

Dual-Use Infrastructure and Western Concerns

In 2004, China established its first research center in the Arctic, the Yellow River Station on the Svalbard Archipelago. Mainly used for scientific purposes, the station collects geodetic observations and atmospheric data. This data is likely to be used in military applications such as surveillance and support in the field. Subsequently, China established the China-Iceland Arctic Science Observatory in Kárhóll, Iceland in 2016, the Chinese Arctic Remote Sensing Satellite Ground Station in Kiruna, Sweden in 2017, and the Greenland Satellite Ground Station in Kangerlussuaq, Greenland in 2017.¹⁵⁾Falco G, Boschetti N & Nikas I (2024) Undercover Infrastructure: Dual-Use Arctic Satellite Ground Stations. CIGI Papers No. 291, March. Waterloo: Centre for International Governance Innovation. https://www.cigionline.org/static/documents/no.291.pdf. Accessed on 26 May 2025

China’s moves are seen as dual-use infrastructure that can serve China’s civilian and military interests. While this situation materializes China’s presence in the Arctic, it increases the concerns of the countries in the region and Western countries. The question of whether China’s Arctic policies are scientific research or strategic moves disguised as civilian ones occupies the minds. In response to such concerns, some Arctic states are taking measures. For example, in 2022, Canada restricted investments by Chinese companies in the telecommunications and mining sectors on national security grounds and took preventive measures to prevent Chinese companies from entering natural resource and digital infrastructure projects in the Arctic.¹⁶⁾U.S. Department of State (2022) Investment Climate Statements: Canada. https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-investment-climate-statements/canada. Accessed on 2 August 2025 In 2018, a Chinese corporation secured infrastructure bids in Greenland, which NATO allies perceived as a security threat, prompting the implementation of countermeasures.¹⁷⁾Reuters (2018) Denmark, Greenland agree to look at airport funding, putting Chinese investors on ice. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-arctic-greenland/denmark-greenland-agree-to-look-at-airport-funding-putting-chinese-investors-on-ice-idUSKBN1J92Y2/. Accessed on 2 August 2025

In the report titled “Military and Security Developments Involving The People’s Republic of China 2024” published by the US Department of Defense, concerns about China are expressed. According to the report, China is trying to advance its strategic and military interests in the Antarctic and Arctic regions under the guise of scientific research. In this context, it has become an observer member of the Arctic Council and aims to access natural resources and new routes with icebreaker ships and research stations. The fact that China is equipped to conduct military cooperation and intelligence activities in the Arctic, especially with Russia, raises US concerns. The US also believes that China intends to use the Antarctic Treaty, which will be renegotiated in 2048, to access resources.¹⁸⁾U.S. Department of Defense (2024) Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2024. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense. The US Department of Defense’s 2024 Arctic Strategy document underlined that China’s activities in the Arctic are to the detriment of the US and its allies, and claimed that dual-use infrastructures complicate the regional security environment.¹⁹⁾U.S. Department of Defense (2024) Arctic Strategy 2024. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Canada’s 2024 Defense Policy Document directly addresses China’s activities in the Arctic. China’s presence in the Arctic and cooperation with Russia has been interpreted as a significant threat to Canada’s northern security. It is also considered that China’s activities increase geopolitical rivalry in the region and that the potential military use of China’s presence requires comprehensive measures.²⁰⁾Department of National Defence (2024) Our North, Strong and Free: A Renewed Vision for Canada’s Defence. Ottawa: Government of Canada.

Conclusion

From climate change to the environment, from economic development to resource utilization, from scientific research to digitalization, China plays a role in the Arctic region. Since 2013, China has had observer status in the Arctic Council, which supports its active participation in the Arctic. China is also a member of previously established organizations such as the Northern Forum and the Arctic Science Committee. In other words, China has been reinforcing its presence in the Arctic through regional organizations for a long time. China is involved in all platforms and agreements related to the region and conducts research activities with its scientific research stations. For all these reasons, China has positioned itself as one of the external states with economic interests in the Arctic.

China’s engagement in the Arctic is guided by the same principles of win-win, mutual respect and cooperation that it promotes in all international affairs. However, China’s quest to build cyber sovereignty in cyberspace calls into question the future of its digital silk road project in the Arctic. With its satellite infrastructure, submarine cables and strategic surveillance activities, China is digitizing its position in the Arctic great power competition. China’s understanding of cyber sovereignty reveals the control and authority of states over digital infrastructures. In this case, China’s digital footprints in the Arctic, such as satellite stations, polar research stations, optical sensors, and fiber optic cables, are a reflection of data diplomacy and cyber sovereignty over satellites and cables. The possibility of dual-use of these infrastructures reveals the Arctic’s potential to be a critical geography for global data flow as well as data security and sovereignty. China-Russia cooperation, especially in the Arctic, has the potential to be a strategy of divergence from the West by two countries that stand out with their ‘multipolar world’ rhetoric. In order to prevent the Arctic from turning into an area of geopolitical competition, digital infrastructures should be adequately supervised by international institutions, binding regulation should be made and the normative gap should be eliminated.

Aybala Lale Kahraman is an Assistant Professor of International Relations at Bursa Technical University.